In May 2018, the European Union began enforcing the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which endowed EU citizens with new personal data rights and imposed new responsibilities on frms. Privacy regulation increases the frm's cost of collecting consumer data which makes matching with users more costly. As such, the GDPR has the potential to reduce both the amount of traÿc to a website as well as the amount and quality of web outcome data stored for analytics purposes. We examine the impact of the GDPR on European web traÿc and e-commerce sales using web analytics data from a diverse set of 1508 frms that use the Adobe Analytics platform. Using a di˙erence-in-di˙erences approach, we show that recorded pageviews and recorded revenues fall by about 10% for EU users after the GDPR's enforcement deadline. The extensive margin drives these changes as a user's average time on site and average page views per visit stay constant.
Introduction
The European Union (EU) is a global leader in privacy regulation whose constitution enshrines the right to privacy. In May 2018, the EU began enforcing its General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), a landmark privacy law that defnes individual privacy rights and restricts how frms can use personal data. By protecting individual privacy, the GDPR can hurt frms that rely on customer analytics to make decisions and for personalized marketing. In particular, online frms collect detailed web analytics data on how users navigate through-and arrive at-websites using platforms like Adobe Analytics. Online frms use web analytics data to better draw users to their sites and to improve site content and usability. Under the GDPR, frms may choose to collect less web analytics data or may fnd that fewer users consent to data collection. The GDPR also increases the cost of personalized marketing channels like e-mail and display ads that draw users to websites. The GDPR may even change user preferences for browsing online by making privacy more salient and actionable. Thus, the GDPR could hurt online frms: 1) directly, by restricting online advertising and changing user browsing preferences, and 2) indirectly, by reducing the web analytics data that informs the frm's decisions.
We empirically investigate for the frst time the impact of privacy policy on recorded web outcomes. We are among the frst to study the GDPR, whose scale and scope has cost many frms millions of dollars in compliance costs (PWC 2018) . Like economic studies of past privacy regulation (e.g. Tucker & Miller 2009 ), we leverage the timing of regulatory enforcement as an event study. We further leverage proprietary data from Adobe Analytics to examine the impact of the GDPR on 1,500 online frms constituting over 1 billion weekly visits by EU residents. These frms include 128 of the top 1,000 global sites and feature a variety of content, e-commerce, and corporate sites. Using a di˙erence-in-di˙erences strategy, we fnd that recorded online outcomes fall about 10% across the board: page views, visits, orders, and revenue. This result is robust to another strategy combining frontier synthetic control and machine learning approaches (Doudchenko & Imbens 2016) . Despite the total reduction, we see no change in user quality metrics, which suggests a frm-driven rather than a consumer-selection driven explanation.
The GDPR is a landmark privacy law that is inspiring a wave of privacy regulation in such countries as Brazil, India, Japan, and South Korea. Similarly, the United States is considering federal privacy regulation to harmonize state privacy laws led by California. The GDPR protects all personal data rather than just personally identifable data or sensitive data categories like health data. The GDPR strengthens individual ownership rights over personal data by granting rights to access, correct, and delete personal data held by frms. Firms must minimize personal data processing and can only process personal data under limited and specifc circumstances. One such circumstance is an individual's explicit opt-in consent, which is well suited to processing clickstream data. Requiring consent increases the cost of collecting web analytics data as well as the personalized digital marketing channels that depend on clickstream data.
Despite the GDPR's importance for the EU's 28 countries and beyond, little is known about the economic consequences of the law. We contribute the frst study of the online economic impact of the GDPR. Contemporary economic research shows that the GDPR hurt venture capital investment (Jia, Jin, & Wagman 2018) . Online, the GDPR led to a reduction in third party cookies Our proprietary data from Adobe Marketing Cloud provides a broad view of the GDPR's online impact. Adobe's web analytics o˙ering is the 4th most frequently installed analytics vendor in the category among top 10,000 sites. 2 . Ours is only the second study to use such Adobe data, after Goolsbee & Klenow (2018) who study online infation. We see the web traÿc of 1,500 frms from such diverse industries as media, travel, and retail across a mixture of content, corporate, and e-commerce sites. Crucially, our data di˙erentiates users by location and arrival point so that we can identify EU users and the marketing channels that push them to sites. Our data include economically important outcomes for di˙erent site types: content sites monetize page views using advertising and e-commerce sites rely on online purchases. Our total data contain over 4.6 billion page views and $0.5 billion in revenue weekly from EU users.
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We use the GDPR's May 2018 enforcement deadline as an event study. We use both di˙erence-in-di˙erences and synthetic control approaches to identify the impact of the GDPR. The former approach uses site activity from the EU in 2017 as a control in order to account for seasonal di˙erences. Across all sites, we estimate that recorded page views fall 9.7% and recorded site visits fall 9.9% post-GDPR. Among e-commerce sites, we estimate that recorded site outcomes fall 5.6% and recorded revenue falls 8.3%. For the median site, this corresponds to a $8000 weekly reduction in revenue. These reductions in recorded web outcomes are robust to a synthetic control approach based on Doudchenko & Imbens (2016) that uses machine learning to match the trend in pre-GDPR web outcomes to a combination of frms from 2017.
Our data o˙ers clues on how the GDPR a˙ects recorded web outcomes. Some frms stop sharing web analytics data with Adobe post-GDPR perhaps due to the GDPR's data minimization mandate. However, we eliminate these frms from our sample by construction: the drop in recorded web outcomes would otherwise be even larger. We also do not fnd evidence of user selection post-GDPR, whether due to user's changing the preference for sites post-GDPR or due to only recording data from consenting users. In particular, we see no change in average time-spent or page views per visit-common user quality metrics. In the future, we intend to use our data on how users arrive to the site (e.g. online ad or direct navigation) for evidence that the GDPR impacted site visits through its impact on advertising.
We proceed by overviewing the GDPR, then presenting the Adobe Analytics data and our results, before concluding.
The General Data Protection Regulation
The European Union (EU) passed the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in April of 2016 and enforcement began on May 25, 2018, giving frms two years to prepare. The GDPR protects the collection, processing, and use-of personal information of EU residents as well as all customers of EU-based frms or frms with EU oÿces. The GDPR expands the defnition of personal information beyond personally-identifable data to include individual-level data like cookies and IP addresses. GDPR fnes can reach the larger of 20 million euros or 4% of global turnover.
The GDPR accords new rights to individuals and responsibilities to data-processing frms.
Individuals receive the right to access their personal data, correct data, erase data, and port data elsewhere as well as the rights to object to data processing and object to decisions based on automated processing. Under the GDPR, frms face both rights-and risk-related obligations. The rights-related obligations require that frms allow individuals to exercise their rights in an easy and timely manner. As for risk-related obligations, frms must appoint a Data Protection Oÿcer to oversee compliance activities and must audit internal data processes. Also, frms must encrypt and anonymize personal data (data protection by design) as well as minimize data collection (data protection by default). In the event of a data breach, frms must promptly notify the regulator and a˙ected individuals. These obligations impose potentially large compliance and opportunity costs on frms. Many frms are spending over 10 million dollars annually to comply with the law and many still are coming into compliance after May 25, 2018 (PWC 2018 .
The GDPR defnes the legal bases for processing personal data. Firms can process data in order to fulfll a contract or legal obligation, to protect the public interest and to protect the vital interest of the individual. Otherwise, frms may obtain an individual's consent. Consent must be aÿrmative (no-pre-checked boxes), freely given, granular to the purpose of processing (e.g. website analytics, behavioral advertising), and must list all third parties who process the data. Finally, frms can claim their own "legitimate interest" as a basis for data processing, though the GDPR cautions this can not override individual data rights. The GDPR thus increases the marginal cost of collecting and using individual data particularly when collecting consent. Below, we explain how the GDPR applies to, and may a˙ect, web analytics.
Web analytics under the GDPR
The EU's current guidance emphasizes consent as the primary legal basis for using web analytics under the GDPR. Data processing is also allowed under a contractual obligation. For example, if a user initiates a purchase on an e-commerce site, that site can process an individual's name, address, and credit card information, under the contractual obligation clause, to complete the transaction.
However, the EU's draft guidelines states that processing data for web analytics-even for the purpose of improving a service by the site-cannot rely on contractual obligation as web analytics are not necessary to fulflling a contract. Instead, regulators have indicated that frms should seek
Total Outcomes
Share Recorded
Firm-Driven
Advertising Data Minimization
User-Driven Privacy Salience Consent By potentially reducing the share of recorded web outcomes, the GDPR creates an identifcation challenge in our web analytics data. In particular, we only observe recorded outcome measures in our data, which is the product of two terms:
This creates an identifcation problem, as both the total outcomes and propensity to record outcomes are likely to be impacted by the GDPR. Further, we lack direct frm or consumer data that would separate the two components. Each component can be a˙ected by frm-driven or user-driven causes. The matrix in fgure 1 identifes the principle mechanism in each case, which we detail below.
Total Outcomes
(a) Advertising E˙ect: The higher costs of using personal information can a˙ect personalized marketing channels that drive online traÿc. For instance, the GDPR increased the legal risk associated with e-mail and online display advertising as both rely on personal data in the form of cookies or the e-mail lists. As such, the quality and quantity of advertising through these channels may fall. Browsing data suggests that e-mail and display ads precede 7 and 3% respectively of visits to e-commerce sites (Budak et al.
2016)
. Similarly, the previous EU privacy legislation has been shown to reduce ad e˙ectiveness by 65% (Goldfarb & Tucker 2011). Therefore this may be an important e˙ect.
We will look for direct evidence for this mechanism using our data on the marketing channel that precede site visits.
(b) Privacy Salience E˙ect: Overall site traÿc may change as users become aware of how their information is used. GDPR enforcement brought ubiquitous privacy notices on websites that serve EU users. By increasing the salience of privacy concerns, these notices may have changed user preferences for how much time users spend online and which sites they frequent. We look for evidence of this channel in user's average time spent and page views per session, because we expect self-selection in the residual user web traÿc.
Share Recorded
(a) Data Minimization E˙ect: The GDPR requires that frms minimize the data they collect about users. Some frms may elect to no longer collect web analytics data or to reduce the duplication in the number of web analytics vendors. We avoid this explanation by construction: our data sample avoids frms who turn o˙ web analytics at our data provider. However, we will struggle to detect frms that reduce data sharing but still report data for reasons unrelated to consumer consent.
(b) Consent: User consent is the primary basis for processing web analytics data. If the site collects and respects user consent, the share of recorded data will be a function of the share of consenting users. Quantcast, the dominant GDPR consent management platform, reports that average website consent rates exceed 90%. As with privacy salience, we expect consenting users will self-select, so that we can we will detect di˙erences in user quality metrics. [In the future, we may be able to obtain auxiliary data on whether and when sites implemented consent management platforms.]
Using the above logic, we look for evidence that speaks to the di˙erent mechanisms.
However, frms di˙er in when and how they comply with the GDPR. As such, many explanations may coexist. Still, the above mechanisms suggest di˙erent policy ramifcations: reducing the share of data recorded may be the more intended policy goal than reducing total web outcomes.
On-site analytics are common tools used online to help frms better understand the types and activities of users on their site. While there are many vendors providing these solutions, the Adobe Experience Cloud, of which Adobe Analytics is part, is one of the largest by market share and a leader in the feld (Forrester 2017). Adobe Analytics both implements recording and tracking technologies for the frm as well as aggregates, cleans, and analyzes the collected data. Recording and tracking is executed primarily through java script. When a user arrives on site, code is triggered and a unique ID is assigned to the user-browser. All behavior during this sessions is then recorded at the interaction level and sent to Adobe's servers where it goes through various cleaning, assignment, and aggregation stages. Adobe allows each frm to assign privacy labels to individuals, and/or individual data felds, using its Data Governance interface. Privacy labels allow each frm to specify which data may be sensitive and need to be anonymized or deleted and which users do not wish to be recorded (Adobe 2018). The cleaned and aggregated data is then displayed to the frm in a Report Suite from which individual reports and views are constructed.
Our data consists of the aggregated user-web page interactions to a weekly panel of outcomes for a large number of global frms. We observe four key outcomes at the country-week level:
• Page views -Consists of a request for full page document by a visitor on site. This excludes partial requests, such as for a particular image or video.
• Visits -Consists of a sequence of consecutive page views without a 30 minute break.
• Orders -The number of a times a purchase event occurs.
• Revenue -Captured at the time of a purchase event and defned as the total currency amount for the sum of the order and each product.
For more technical information please see the Adobe Analytics reference documentation (Adobe (2018)). We aggregate these outcomes to the week European Union level. After aggregating, we are left with a weekly panel of the above four outcomes for 1508 analytics dashboards or Report Suite Identifers (RSID's). It is important to note that this data is constructed in order to provide each frm with insight into its own online presence, operations, and customers -not for research purposes. In particular, RSID's may consist of arbitrary aggregations of traÿc across multiple domains or sub-domains. For example, considering a retailer with both US and UK facing sites.
The retailer could choose: (1) to combine both sites into one RSID, (2) create an RSID for each site, or (3) create multiple RSID's with duplicate information. We are able to flter out duplicated RSID's for our analysis, but not split RSID's up by domain -thus we take RSID as our natural unit of analysis.
The fnal data set is obtained at a weekly frequency, by RSID-country, for the 2nd through for which there are less than 100 average daily visits from the EU in the pre-treatment period. This is because with such low levels of European traÿc, noise is an issue. RSID's for which the ratio of average daily visits (in the pre-treatment period) in 2017 versus 2018 is larger than 170 percent or smaller than 30 percent are dropped to avoid situations in which there is a change in reporting.
Finally, we drop all RSID's that we can identify as corresponding to mobile dashboards, and for which there are serious reporting outages (more than 3 weeks of zero data in the pre-period). With the remaining RSID's we construct a panel at a weekly frequency for the dates above. This results in a fnal data set consisting of 1508 RSID's for which we have weekly data throughout the whole period above and meet the fltering criteria.
e-commerce Sample Selection
There is an important distinction, with respect to reporting, between page views/visits and orders/revenue. While page views and visits are automatically collected and aggregated by the Adobe Analytics platform, orders and revenue (e-commerce outcomes) are only constructed when requested by the client. This is not ubiquitous, as many clients are not e-commerce frms. Similarly, many RSID's do not correspond to clients selling merchandise, thus such metrics are meaningless.
Therefore, some fltering of the sample is necessary to not bias our e-commerce results towards zero. In particular, we remove any RSID's for which we observe average daily revenue and orders of less than one 3 across the entire pre-treatment period. Fundamentally, due to the ad hoc nature of the revenue data collection, these metrics are subject to more noise than page views and visits.
For this reason we additionally trim the distribution of revenue, only including the middle 1 -99 percentiles. After fltering, this results in a sample of 421 RSID's.
Descriptive Results
Our preference for logged dependent variables in our analysis. Figure 1 plots the logged average weekly outcome of each RSID. We can see that these distributions look approximately normal, but still exhibit signifcant dispersion.
To get a sense of the types of frms our RSID's represent, as well as their size, we can take advantage of site classifcations from Amazon Web Information Services (AWIS). In particular, we can use the URL's associated with our RSID's to merge meta data from Adobe with AWIS. Of our 1508 RSID's we can successfully match 1293 to at least one URL in the AWIS top 1 million sites.
Because each RSID may be associated with multiple URL's we present two metrics of site rank: Table 2 : 2018 EU pre-treatment weekly summary statistics Our RSID's represent a substantial amount of e-commerce and are somewhat diverse in their size. The full sample of frms seem to be somewhat smaller than the e-commerce sample. 
rank(RSID
Both of the above measures have short comings. Because RSID's often have both large and small sites contributing to them the frst measure likely overstates the RSID's rank while the second understates it. From table 3 we can see that most of our RSID's represent relatively large sites in the top 10,000 sites globally and many correspond to multiple sites with diverse ranks. We also include the total number of URL's we cover within each bucket -our 1293 RSID's correspond to 2594 di˙erent URL's in the Alexa top million sites.
Of paramount interest for our empirical strategy are the intertemporal trends present in the data, pre and post GDPR. In fgure 2 we present weekly averages, across RSID's, for the key metrics of interest across the sample period. The vertical line marks May 25th. To more clearly illustrate the trends in the data, data from the prior year is included as well. In general, there is evidence of a distinct level shift in the post period, roughly 4 weeks after the implementation of GDPR, relative to the trends in 2017. We can see that this trend is persistent for the remainder of the sample and that the behavior of the 2017 time-series is similar to that of the 2018 time-series.
One key feature of the above fgures is the slightly delayed crossing of the 2018 and 2017 trends. In particular, this happens roughly four weeks after the GDPR is implemented. This lag could be driven by the cumulative e˙ect of a decrease consumer tracking in targeting, and/or a heterogeneous timing of implementation of consent walls. While we do not have data on the timing of frm actions, section 2.1 discusses ways in which we can try to recover evidence of di˙erent frm 4 behaviors from our data. Section 5.2 provides some evidence of robustness to potential anticipation and delay e˙ects.
Di˙erences-in-Di˙erences Results: Adobe Analytics Data
Recorded Outcomes
The primary analysis will relies on a di˙erences-in-di˙erences specifcation. The ideal control group in this setting would be a set of RSID's for which a substantial portion of traÿc is from the EU and who do not have to comply with GDPR post May 25th. As GDPR applies to all EU web traÿc, this is infeasible. Instead, we propose using the same RSID 2017 traÿc as our control group. This is a reasonable control group in that it e˙ectively accounts for any seasonal or time e˙ects orthogonal to yearly di˙erences. For example, June is the beginning of the European summer for which our 2017 control group should e˙ectively control for. One might also consider using contemporaneous outcome measures from North America as a control group. Unfortunately, this group is likely to su˙er from substantial spill over e˙ects from the GDPR as many organizations implemented their compliance solutions globally 5 . Figure 2 suggests that using 2017 same RSID metrics as our control group is viable. In section 5.4 we explore other potential control group specifcations.
Our di˙erences-in-di˙erences regression takes the following form:
The primary coeÿcient of interest is β, which is an estimate of the average treatment e˙ect under normal di˙erences-in-di˙erences identifcation assumptions (Angrist& Pischke 2008). To simplify notation in the following, t will refer to year, w to week, and i to RSID. Our recorded outcome is y itw , θ i are fxed e˙ects at the RSID level, η i w are RSID x week fxed e˙ects, 1{2018} is a dummy variable for if the observation is from 2018 (analogous to the treatment-control dummy in a standard di˙erences-in-di˙erences specifcation) and 1{Post GDPR} is a dummy variable for after the enforcement date of May 25th. Note that 1{Post GDPR} dummy is collinear with the week fxed e˙ects, and thus omitted. As discussed in section 3.2, we use logged outcome measures as the distributions of recorded outcome measures are highly skewed.
We can apply the above regression design to our metrics to examine how GDPR has impacted our four key outcomes. Results for our preferred specifcation are presented in table 4 .
We see large statistically signifcant decreases across all of our key metrics. For the full sample of frms, we see an average decrease of −0.097 and −0.099 for both visits and page views. As such caution should be used in over interpreting di˙erences in point estimates.
Heterogeneity
Evidence presented in section 3 suggests there is signifcant heterogeneity across our sample of
RSIDs. This will likely lead to heterogeneity in site outcomes as well. To examine this we can use a triple di˙erences-in-di˙erences strategy. We begin by classifying sites as either 'small' or 'large.'
To do so, we split the distribution of average weekly visits, from the EU, in the pre-GDPR period (presented in fgure 1) at the median -with sites above the median classifed as 'large.' This is done separately for the for full frm sample and the E-commerce sample. We then estimate equation 2.
From equation ?? we are interested in the di˙erences between β 1 , the treatment e˙ect for small frms, and β 2 , the treatment e˙ect for larger frms. All
User Behavior

Visit Quality Metrics
Though we fnd large changes in recorded outcomes in Appealing to fgure 3, we see that both metrics have higher levels across the pre and post period in 2017. In both cases, there is little evidence of change in the post GDPR period. Table 5 demonstrates that we see no evidence of a change in how much users are using sites, on average. Importantly, these estimates are precise -our standard errors suggest that were e˙ects large enough to be economically meaninful, we would be able to measure them. These null e˙ects suggest that the types of users who visit in the post period are similar to those that were visiting in the pre-period. To the extent that we think di˙erent mechanisms may impact the distribution of consumer types who visit a site, the above statistics are informative. In particular, because we see little change in how much time users spend on a site per visit, we take this as evidence that privacy salience is playing a limited role. On the contrary, if privacy salience was leading users to change their browsing behavior, we would likely see a positive e˙ect. Users who value the site less would substitute away from using the site, leading average quality statistics to increase as the remaining population values the site, on average, more. On the other hand, if the utility from site usage and privacy concerns are positively correlated, this argument fails. It is unclear under what circumstance privacy preferences and site utility may be positively correlated, but we cannot rule this out. In this case, we might expect users to utilize the opt-out features made available by the GDPR -leading to high-value users dropping out of our data and our quality metrics decreasing in the post-GDPR period. We also do not see this, though we cannot rule out that the two e˙ects above cancel each other out. Therefore, we conclude that privacy salience and opt-outs are either playing a limited role or uncorrelated with privacy preferences.
Robustness
Placebo Tests
While the point estimates we present in table 4 are large and statistically signifcant, they do not rule out the potential of false positives. In order to address this we can run placebo tests.
We implement placebo tests by frst choosing a counterfactual treatment week from the pre-GDPR period of our data. Then equation 3 is estimated using data from before April 25th (pre-GDPR). We use exclude one-month before the implementation of the GDPR in order to omit any anticipation behavior. This procedure is repeated for placebo treatment dates ranging from 17 to 7 week prior to May 25th for a total of 11 placebo tests. These placebo dates are chosen in order to provide adequate pre-trend and post-trends in the data (at least 3 data points before and after the placebo treatment).
The primary coeÿcient of interest is β p . Fixed e˙ects are included just as in equation The placebo results generally demonstrate a robustness of our identifcation strategy and point estimates in table 4. We can see that no estimates match the magnitude of our main results, nor are any of the placebo tests nearly as statistically signifcant. Confdence intervals tend to get larger as we move to the right in each of these fgures -this is a mechanical refection of the decreasing number of post-placebo treatment periods. While page views have a substantial number of signifcant treatment e˙ect estimates, they are positive and generally small point estimates.
These signifcant e˙ects, as well as the trend in placebo estimates for orders and revenue, may be suggestive of a poor control group, which leads us to considering other control groups in sections 5.4 and 5.3.
Timing of Implementation
A critical assumption to identifcation of the true average treatment e˙ect in 4.1 is that there is not pre May 25th 2018 implementation of GDPR compliance, or no treatment anticipation. While we do not directly observe compliance behaviors, anecdotal evidence resoundingly suggests that frms were unprepared for the GDPR 6 . In order to address treatment anticipation we can remove a one month window around our treatment date and re-run the regression in equation 1. This exercise will help remove any transitory e˙ects around the implementation of the GDPR. Results of this exercise are presented in table 6.
Full Sample E-Commerce Sample
Page Views Visits Page Views Visits Orders Revenue Comparing tables 6 and 4, we can see that our point estimates are unchanged. Thus, it seems that at least short term anticipation e˙ects are not playing a large role in our identifcation strategy.
Triple Di˙erences-in-Di˙erences
If global macroeconomic trends di˙er substantially in 2018 and 2017 our regression in equation 1
will not estimate the true average treatment e˙ect. One way to address this is through a triple di˙erences-in-di˙erences regression design using our North America data to control for global changes in trends. This strategy is also potentially fawed; to the extent that there are spill-overs from the GDPR on North American outcomes, and these spill-overs negatively infuence outcomes, regression 1 will underestimate the average treatment e˙ect.
We estimate the following equation:
The regression is run at the RSID (i), year (t), week (w), region (n) level. The primary coeÿcient of interest is β. We include full interactions of indicators for geography, year, and post-GDPR. Note that indicators for post-GDPR, EU, and post-GDPR x EU are absorbed by fxed e˙ects; we include RSID, week, week x region, and region x RSID fxed e˙ects. Estimation results from equation 4 are presented in table 7 .
As expected, we can see that the majority of our point estimate decrease but remain substantially negative and signifcant. The one exception to this our E-commerce sample estimate for page views, which is very small and insignifcant.
Synthetic Controls
While previous year same RSID web traÿc may help control for seasonality there are potentially other concerns in using this approach. In particular, changes in reporting across years, changes in web traÿc due to advertising or product launches, and other cross-year within-frm di˙erences could lead to a violation of the parallel trends assumption necessary for identifcation in a di˙erencesin-di˙erences model. In order to provide evidence of robustness of our results to such concerns we appeal to the method of synthetic controls (Abadie (2010) and Doudchenko & Imbens (2017) ).
Synthetic controls constructs a control group by taking a weighted average of control units to best predict the counter factual for the treated unit. This control group is known as the 'synthetic control' and will satisfy parallel trends by construction. With a control and treatment group in hand, we can recover the average treatment e˙ect through an approach such as di˙erencesin-di˙erences. Intuitively, the idea is that if we can construct a control group that behaves similarly enough to the treatment group in the pre-period, then this control group behaves similarly to how 
(3) Week Index
Log Revenue
Synthetic Controls: Log Revenue Synthetic Control Treated Data Figure 5 : Fitted Synthetic Controls. We can see a good (as expected) ft in the pre-GDPR period and reasonable trends in the post period that seem overall quite similar to those noted in fgure 2. Page views and visits are presented for the full sample.
the treatment group would have behaved, after the intervention date, had it not received treatment.
The problem then becomes one of constructing the synthetic control. In our implementation, we use 2017-RSID data as our control units and the mean of 2018-RSID data as our treated unit. Because we have many more control units than pre-treatment periods, we follow Doudchenko & Imbens (2017) and use an elastic net to construct our synthetic control. Details on the cross-validation and model ftting procedure are presented in appendix A.
We begin by plotting the ftted trends in fgure 5. We can see that our elastic net does a good job of ftting our treated group in the pre-GDPR period and trends in the post period are largely similar to the average 2017 trends in fgure 2. Note that we see large drops discrepancies between the synthetic control group and the treated group in the post-GDPR period -indicating that the GDPR may have had an e˙ect. Similarly, we can see that the delayed crossing noted in fgure 2 is apparent for the orders and revenue outcomes here. This may not be surprising as the synthetic control group is constructed of 2017 RSID data -but does suggest that trends in 2017 in the post-GDPR period are substantially di˙erent than in 2018. Our point estimates for each outcome are presented in • Fit an elastic net to C as described in appendix A t • Calculate the adjusted mean squared prediction error (Abadie (2010)):
That is, we calculate the mean squared prediction error and scale it by the mean squared ftting error
• Repeat 250 times for each outcome
The above procedure gives us a sense of how large the adjusted mean square error calculated using the actual treated units (the synthetic controls refected in fgure 5) is compared to the same procedure on non-treated units. Our takeaways from this procedure should be that if the adjusted mean squared error in the treated case is larger than in the psuedo-treated case, there is some evidence that our treatment has had an e˙ect. Importantly, this procedure will disadvantage our estimates as using an n = 25 to construct our psuedo-treated unit will lead to a noisier treated group than in the actual case, in which we use the full sample of frms. The results of the above procedure are presented in fgure 6. Using data from Adobe Analytics, we are able to quantify the impact of GDPR on important economic outcomes for a diverse set of frms. We fnd large mean e˙ects: page views per 24 6 7
week drop by approximately 4% and revenue per week falls by 8%. These are economically large numbers, with a 8% revenue per week drop corresponding to a $8,000 drop in weekly revenue for the median RSID in our sample. We provide some evidence that these results are not driven by changes in user behavior directly. From a regulators perspective the above results clearly illustrate the diÿculty and high costs of privacy regulation. The Adobe Analytics data illustrate just a portion of the total cost of complying with GDPR -omitting large operational and infrastructure costs. More work needs to be done to quantify the beneft to users of these privacy laws in order to better understand the tradeo˙s. An indicator of this are the opt-in numbers cited in the introduction, which suggest that GDPR may not actually be delivering that much value to the majority of users. Regardless, it is likely true that GDPR has impacted di˙erent sites in very di˙erent ways, and regulators may want to consider this when working on future legislation. Firms have reacted in diverse ways and have implemented compliance in various fashions, often driven by their business needs. Legislators may want to consider why and how frms are using user information more explicitly in legislation to better address these asymmetries.
While this paper has some interesting and compelling fndings more work is left to be done. In particular our next steps include using last touch attribution data to examine if users have changed how they arrive on site and bringing in auxiliary data to more directly examine the data minimization and consent channels of the mechanism.
Appendix A Cross-validation Routine for Synthetic Controls
Estimating the weights necessary to construct the control group is diÿcult and not well understood (Doudchenko and Imbens (2017) ). For the following discussion, T 0 will be the period before which the intervention takes place, Y (0) is the counterfactual outcome, and Y (1) is the observed outcome of the treatment. In our setting, we will use 2017 RSID log outcome data as control units and the average across RSID's of 2018 log outcome data as our treatment unit. That is, for each outcome variable, we have a treatment unit and a set of control units:
it The problem of estimating weights then becomes one of choosing a weighted combination of C it to best match Y t . The literature has used a variety of di˙erent methods to accomplish this task (Doudchenko and Imbens (2017)). In our setting, we have twenty-one pre-treatment time periods and 1508 control units. That is, we have a situation in which N >> T 0 . Because of this, we follow Doudchenko and Imbens (2017) in using an elastic net to construct our control group.
See Zou and Hastie (2005) for a detailed discussion of elastic nets and their properties. In brief, we ft a model with the following objective function:
Where µ is a constant, ω is a vector of length N of weights, and α and λ are penalty parameters chosen by the econometrician. We choose penalty parameters using a modifed version of the cross validation routine proposed in Doudchenko and Imbens (2017).
In particular, for a proposed pair of penalty parameters, {α 0 , λ 0 }, we construct pseudo treated units as follows. First, we partition C into B random partitions of size b. We will refer to a partition as C b . Each C b is used to construct a pseudo treated unit, Y C b , by taking the average t over i ∈ C b . We use C ˜= C \ C b as the control units for pseudo treated unit Y C b . An elastic net t b is ftted, using only pre-intervention data, to obtain {μ , ω b }. That is:
Given the weights estimated above, using the proposed penalty parameters {α 0 , λ 0 }, we predict the outcome for Y C (0) in t > T 0 and construct the mean squared error for each B.
Model performance is then evaluated using the average, across our B partitions, of the cross validated mean squared error.
Finally, tuning parameters are chosen such that {α, λ} = argmin α 0 ,λ 0 CV (α 0 , λ 0 ). Using these tuning parameters, the model in equation 8 is ftted with the control units and treatment groups constructed in equation 6. From here, a di˙erences-in-di˙erences regression is run to recover the average treatment e˙ect under the assumption that Y C (0) = Y T (0). 
